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Abstract. In this extended abstract I describe some norm typolgies
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we can determine the bounderies of the different approaches to normative
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1 Extended abstract
The concept of a norm is problematic. Not only due to the different views on
norms in different research areas, but also since the concept is used in every-
day life in ambiguous ways. As in folkpsychology, the use of ”‘folksociological”’
concepts in scientific research creates problems. To deal with both problems I
propose to analyse available norm typologies to create a framework with which
to evaluate the possiblities and impossiblities to adress different types of norms
using various approaches to normative agentsystems.
Morris [1] proposes a definitional difference betweeen norms and the closely
related concept of values after whcih he proceeds to present a classification
scheme for different types of norms. Following [2] he proposes that values can
be held individually and never include sanctions whereas norms are ”‘generally
accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, or prohibitions against, others’ behavior,
belief, or feeling, i.e. what others ought to do believe, feel - or else (original
emphasis). Also, values only apply to the person having the values, while norms
have subjects (who set the norms) and objects (to whom the norms are ap-
plied). Morris concludes by summing up a selection of 17 characteristics in four
categories that can be used to typify norms. These are:
1. Distribution of the Norm
(a) Extent of Knowledge of the Norm
– By subjects (those who set the norm) - very few – almost everyone
– By objects (those to whom the norm applies) - very few – almost
everyone
(b) Extent of Acceptance of or Agreement with the Norm
– By subjects (those who set the norm) - very few – almost everyone
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– By objects (those to whom the norm applies) - very few – almost
everyone
(c) Extent of Application if the Norm to Objects
– To groups or categories - very few – almost everyone
– To conditions - in specified few – in almost all
2. Mode of Enforcement of the Norm
– Reward - Punishment - more reward than punishment – more punish-
ment than reward
– Severity of sanction - light, unimportant – heavy, important
– Enforcing agency - specialized, designated responsibility – general, uni-
versal responsibility
– Extent of enforcement - lax, intermittent – rigorous, uniform
– Source of authority - rational, expedient, instrumental – divine, inherent,
absolute, autonomous
– Degree of internalization by objects - litlle, external enforcement required
– great, self-enforcement sufficient
3. Transmission of the Norm
(a) Socialization process - late learning, from secondary relations – early
learning, from primary relations
(b) Degree of reinforcement by subject - very little – high, persistent
4. Conformity to the Norm
(a) Amount of conformity attempted by objects - attempted by very few –
attempted by almost everyone
(b) Amount of deviance by objects - very great – very little
(c) Kind of deviance - formation of subnorms – patterned evasion – idiosyn-
cratic deviation
Two general types of norms that can be inferred from this classification
scheme are what [1] calls an absolute norm and a conditional norm. In the
first case all right hand side characteristics apply while for conditional norms all
left hand extremes apply.
In the 1960’s Gibbs [3] followed up on Morris’s work by distinguishing def-
initional and contingent attributes in Morris’s list of characteristics. The end
product is a typology of norms encompassing conventions, morals, mores, rules
and laws as depicted in figure 1.
Tuomela [4] on his turn distinguishes two kinds of social norms (meaning
community norms), namely, rules (r-norms) and proper social norms (s-norms).
Rules are norms created by an authority structure and are always based on
agreement making. Proper social norms are based on mutual belief. Rules can
be formal, in which case they are connected to formal sanctions, or informal,
where the sanctions are also informal. Proper social norms consist of conventions,
which apply to a large group such as a whole society or socioeconomic class, and
group-specific norms. The sanctions connected to both types of proper social
norms are social sanctions and may include punishment by others and expelling
from the group. Aside from these norms, Tuomela also described personal norms
and potential social norms (these are norms that are normally widely obeyed
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Fig. 1. Norm typology developed by Gibbs [3]
but that are not in their essence based on social responsiveness and that, in
principle, could be personal only). These potential social norms contain, among
others, moral and prudential norms (m-norms and p-norms, respectively). The
reasons for accepting norms differ as to the kind of norms:
– Rules are obeyed because they are agreed upon.
– Proper social norms are obeyed because others expect one to obey.
– Moral norms are obeyed because of ones conscience.
– Prudential norms are obeyed because it is the rational thing to do.
The motivational power of all types of norms depends on the norm being a
subjects reason for action. In other words, norms need to be internalized and
accepted.
Therborn [5] distinguishes among three kinds of norms. Constitutive norms
define a system of action and an agent’s membership in it, regulative norms de-
scribe the expected contributions to the social system, and distributive norms
defining how rewards, costs, and risks are allocated within a social system. Fur-
thermore, he distinguishes between non-institutionalized normative order, made
up by personal and moral norms in day-to-day social traffic, and institutions,
an example of a social system defined as a closed system of norms. Institutional
normative action is equaled with role plays, i.e., roles find their expressions in
expectations, obligations, and rights vis-a-vis the role holder’s behaviour.
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